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How much would you say the Dow lost on Black Monday?

Black Monday: the 508-point fall and the Federal Reserve record

By Phil Springer, Editor · Published · Updated · Money Stumper

Black Monday: the 508-point fall and the Federal Reserve record

Black Monday ended with the Dow Jones Industrial Average down 508 points on October 19, 1987. That was a 22.6 percent loss in one session, about 23 percent rounded to a whole number. The preceding Friday had already taken 4.6 percent off the index. Federal Reserve History records the scale of those losses; the Federal Open Market Committee's surviving documents show officials managing the aftermath without knowing how severely it would affect the wider economy. The collapse generated a crisis in financing and completing trades as well as in quoted share prices.

Mark Carlson's later Federal Reserve study reconstructed an information failure during Black Monday. Many New York Stock Exchange specialists delayed opening their stocks because sell orders so heavily exceeded buy orders. At 10 a.m., 95 stocks in the S&P index had still not opened, representing 30 percent of its value. An index calculated from the latest available trades consequently included old prices for stocks that were not trading. Futures markets opened on time and fell sharply. The apparent gap between futures and cash-market indexes therefore incorporated prices that did not belong to the same trading moment.

Carlson also described computer models behind portfolio insurance. They called for reduced stock exposure as prices fell, frequently through sales of index futures. The models ran periodically, producing batches of transactions. His review compared investigations that disagreed about the strategy's responsibility for the crash. Portfolio insurers were major sellers, but other institutions sold heavily too. Trade reports on the exchange arrived more than an hour late. Alongside falling prices, participants faced uncertainty over whether orders had executed. These operational failures complicated transactions already under intense selling pressure.

The contemporary policy record describes the Federal Reserve's response to Black Monday in specific operational terms. During the last two weeks of October, committee members held daily telephone conferences. They agreed to meet unusual demands for liquidity promptly, and reserves were supplied generously, often unusually early in the day. Banks wanted larger cushions of excess reserves, while transaction deposits rose sharply and increased required reserves. The federal funds rate, above 7.5 percent immediately before October 19, dropped to 7 percent and below afterward. These were recorded changes in the money market as institutions sought cash.

The same record documented temporary relaxation of restrictions on lending Treasury securities to primary dealers. Limits on loans to individual dealers and a restriction concerning short sales were suspended; a secretary's note recorded termination of that liberalization on November 19. Published on December 18, the record summarized the November 3 meeting using information available then. Nationwide business data still largely described conditions before the stock collapse. The committee had evidence of a brisk third quarter, while the economic consequences of the market shock remained uncertain.

The November 3 transcript supplies a more direct view of the choices behind those operations. Governor Seger pressed domestic operations manager Peter Sternlight about the concentration on repurchase agreements instead of outright Treasury-bill purchases. Sternlight explained that earlier projections had suggested a temporary reserve shortage, followed by only a modest need. Buying heavily outright might have left excess reserves that later needed draining from fragile markets. As projections changed, a longer-lasting need became apparent. He acknowledged that outright purchases might have made sense in retrospect, while defending repeated repurchase operations as support for daily financing. He then requested a temporary $3 billion increase in a normal $6 billion operating allowance. The motions passed. The exchange preserved uncertainty and revision within the central bank's response, including the difference between the reserve forecasts available initially and those available two weeks later.

A later speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke examined another part of Black Monday's aftermath: clearinghouses. In April 2011, he described the extraordinary volume and volatility during the week of October 19 as producing errors and delays in confirmations of stock trades. Clearing members faced operational stress and large demands for liquid funds. Derivatives clearinghouses made repeated margin calls within a single day to protect themselves. Banks sometimes delayed payments to and from clearinghouses. Bernanke's retrospective emphasized that trades already agreed in the market still required institutions and banks to complete the payments behind them.

Bernanke also described clearinghouses collecting variation margin without always paying it out promptly, absorbing cash during the day. Although the system avoided defaults, uncertainty about clearinghouses and major broker-dealers intensified panic. Subsequent work clarified obligations among clearinghouses, their members, and settlement banks, while strengthening available financial resources. His 2011 remarks concerned weaknesses exposed by the episode and reforms that followed. The committee's 1987 documents, by comparison, captured officials providing reserves and adjusting operations while market conditions and the immediate economic outlook were still unsettled.

The Dow recovered 288 points over the next two trading sessions, according to Federal Reserve History. The Black Monday losses were not followed by a recession or a banking crisis. Exchanges later introduced circuit breakers to pause trading after unusually large declines.

The Question

On Black Monday in 1987, roughly how much did the Dow Jones Industrial Average fall in one trading day?

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The Answer

About 23 percent, specifically 22.6 percent.

On October 19, 1987, the Dow fell 508 points as selling spread through global markets. The crash helped bring about trading pauses called circuit breakers, but it was not followed by a recession.

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