Lehman Brothers and the September 2008 Bankruptcy
Early on Monday, September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy after a weekend effort to arrange a private rescue failed. The Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and Securities and Exchange Commission had brought leaders of major financial firms together to seek a solution. None emerged. The investment bank's filing became a major event in a crisis that had already strained financial markets, with losses mounting and funding disappearing. Other prominent firms would receive assistance through different arrangements, but the weekend negotiations left Lehman to enter bankruptcy while the effects of the wider crisis continued spreading through financial relationships.
The trouble had roots in the housing market. A long expansion in construction and home prices was followed by a downturn that exposed poor lending practices, especially in subprime mortgages extended to less-creditworthy borrowers. Originators packaged mortgages into complex securities, sometimes alongside other kinds of loans, and sold them worldwide after credit rating agencies approved them. Many securities were held in off-balance-sheet vehicles financed with short-term borrowing. Falling house prices and increasing defaults made investors uncertain about mortgage-related losses. The risk traveled beyond the original borrowers through securities and financing arrangements linking housing debt to institutions across the financial system.
Bear Stearns had reached a crisis months earlier. On March 13, 2008, the securities firm told the Federal Reserve that it expected to lack the funding or liquid assets needed to meet the next day's obligations. It expected to be unable to find private financing. The New York Fed extended credit through JPMorgan Chase, but market pressure continued. On March 16, Bear Stearns accepted a merger with JPMorgan in a transaction facilitated by the Fed. A company called Maiden Lane purchased illiquid assets with loans from the New York Fed and JPMorgan. Temporary financing led into an assisted acquisition, giving that investment bank a path different from bankruptcy.
By September, creditors and counterparties were intensifying demands on Lehman Brothers. They called in loans or sought additional collateral, producing pressure resembling a traditional bank run through financial transactions rather than a queue of retail depositors. Efforts to find a buyer failed. Ben Bernanke later attributed the inability to lend directly to Lehman to insufficient collateral of suitable quality and quantity. The assets available could not give the Federal Reserve sufficient assurance that a loan would be repaid. The attempted rescue thus faced both a failed search for a private solution and a lending constraint tied to collateral.
The parent company's bankruptcy did not mean every part of Lehman Brothers lacked access to broader lending programs. Its primary dealer subsidiary participated in facilities established earlier in 2008. On September 12, it had $18.5 billion outstanding at the Term Securities Lending Facility. On September 15, the bankruptcy filing date, it borrowed $28 billion through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. All borrowing ceased on September 18. These were general facilities for primary dealers, rather than a rescue program created specifically for the institution. The subsidiary's borrowing continued briefly across the parent's filing, placing different forms of assistance within the same week.
AIG received support on September 16. Through an unregulated subsidiary, the insurance and financial-services company had entered credit default swaps protecting counterparties against losses on debt instruments, many related to mortgages. Contractual demands for collateral rose, and AIG could not meet them without help. The New York Fed extended credit, while the Treasury received a 79.9 percent equity interest. Bernanke later said AIG had enough assets to secure Federal Reserve lending, unlike Lehman Brothers. The arrangement was restructured in November 2008 and again in March 2009, extending the intervention beyond the immediate emergency and changing its financing terms over time.
The bankruptcy then reached short-term money markets. On September 16, a prominent money market fund announced that losses on Lehman commercial paper prevented it from redeeming shares at the usual $1 price. Investors withdrew money from that fund and others. Funds sold commercial paper to meet the outflows, while some investors moved into government-only funds and others left money market funds altogether. The Treasury announced a temporary guarantee program, and the Federal Reserve created a liquidity facility. Over the following weeks, frightened investors withdrew more than $400 billion from money funds, spreading financial pressure into markets used for short-term financing.
The damage reached businesses and workers around the world. Production and payrolls were cut, and international trade collapsed. By April 2010, the American economy had stabilized and begun growing again, but one worker in ten was unemployed and bank lending remained weak. The Federal Reserve held its target short-term interest rate near zero and purchased more than $1.7 trillion in Treasury securities and securities issued or guaranteed by housing-related government-sponsored enterprises. It also worked with fourteen foreign central banks to provide dollar funding in their markets, responding to demand that had disrupted money markets and squeezed credit availability in the United States.
- Support for Specific Institutions, Federal Reserve History — www.federalreservehistory.org
- Economic Challenges: Past, Present, and Future, Federal Reserve Board — www.federalreserve.gov
- The Great Recession and Its Aftermath, Federal Reserve History — www.federalreservehistory.org