Operation Bernhard: forged notes in the Bank's own records
Operation Bernhard left the Bank of England with both counterfeit currency and a documentary trail of its detection. Nazi Germany forced concentration camp prisoners to manufacture British notes, while German intelligence used the output to pay agents and purchase supplies. The Bank's museum preserves a counterfeit £5 note as object 891/001, dated to 1942–1945. The apparently ordinary piece of money belongs to a system of coercion and clandestine spending, whose traces extend from a camp workshop to British banking records.
The museum's history places an earlier initiative, Operation Andreas, in 1940 and the revival under Bernhard Krueger in 1942. It describes 142 Jewish prisoners assembled at Sachsenhausen for their knowledge of engraving, printing, graphics and banking. The British design was black on white cotton-rag paper, with Britannia in the upper left corner and printing on only one side. The prisoners studied genuine notes, copied security details and signatures, and handled the counterfeits to give them the appearance of circulation.
The Bank's retrospective history gives Operation Bernhard an estimated output of almost 9 million notes with a face value of £134 million. That sum represented more than a tenth of the British notes then in circulation, according to the institution. Face value is the amount printed on the paper; it does not establish how much reached Britain or how much purchasing power the operation obtained. The distinction is essential when comparing a workshop's output with the money that its distributors actually managed to spend.
The original institutional war history supplies a smaller, dated encounter with the forgeries. Its chapter on banknotes records nine counterfeit £10 notes arriving from Tangier on 21 September 1942. The Bank classified this variety as type BB. The reproduction was exceptionally close, and the paper initially offered the principal means of recognizing the difference. Examiners used a quartz lamp and prolonged microscopic inspection. The chapter records only one consistent small printing irregularity, in Britannia's hair. Operation Bernhard was confronting an institution that examined suspect paper as well as its printed promises.
The same chapter follows a suspicious Swiss parcel containing 6,000 £10 notes and 4,000 £5 notes. Samples sent for examination were identified as BB forgeries. It then records 9,989 examples of that type received by 8 May 1945 across four denominations, from £5 to £50. That is a count of specimens reaching the Bank, distinct from the much larger production estimate in its later history. The original record also separates confidential suspicions of German state involvement from subsequent Allied seizures of equipment and unissued counterfeits. Suspicion, identification and capture happened at different stages.
The purpose of Operation Bernhard also emerges from records beyond the Bank. Historian Richard Breitman's analysis of declassified CIA files, published by the United States National Archives, identifies Friedrich Schwend as a wartime distributor of forged British pounds. The money helped finance the Reich Security Main Office's intelligence operations. That finding gives the counterfeits a specific institutional destination. A plan associated with weakening sterling also supplied funds to German intelligence, linking the forced manufacture of paper money to the activities of people who circulated it abroad.
Breitman explains the nature of those intelligence files: collections that can combine interrogations, informants' reports, internal correspondence, published material and agency analysis. They are not complete collections of everything an agency held about an individual. His identification of Schwend's wartime role therefore belongs to a documented review of mixed records, rather than to an assumption that every statement inside a secret file carries equal authority. Operation Bernhard's financing role is supported there without requiring the attribution of every later transaction or intelligence rumor to its counterfeit notes.
British archival cataloguing preserves the aftermath separately. Cashier's Department file C5/191 is titled Forgery of £5 and Upwards, Type BB and covers 1949–1964. Its description includes cooperation with United States authorities, manufacture in concentration camps, recovery from Toplitzsee and correspondence with Fernand Romano. A listed letter dated 9 May 1959 concerns printing specialist Mr Reeves and Scotland Yard inspectors Rudkin and Minter. Those are descriptions of retained correspondence, not a transcript of each letter. They establish that the administrative trail of Operation Bernhard continued well beyond Germany's defeat.
The Bank's response changed the currency itself. Its history dates its first use of a metallic thread in a banknote to the emergency blue £1 of 1940 and the suspension of issues above £5 to 1943. The older high-value designs and their production methods had remained substantially unchanged for nearly a century. The museum dates the prisoners' liberation by United States forces to 6 May 1945. Counterfeit notes continued to appear in circulation after the war, and a £10 denomination returned only in 1964.
- Bank of England Museum, Operation Bernhard, 26 January 2024; counterfeit £5 object 891/001 — www.bankofengland.co.uk
- Bank of England Archive, The Bank of England 1939–1945, Part I, chapter VIII, Bank Notes, printed pages 231–233 — www.bankofengland.co.uk
- Bank of England, History: Wartime banknote forgeries — www.bankofengland.co.uk
- Bank of England Archive, C5/191: Forgery of £5 and Upwards, Type BB, 1949–1964 — www.bankofengland.co.uk
- Richard Breitman, United States National Archives, Historical Analysis of 20 Name Files from CIA Records, pages 1–2 — www.archives.gov