The bank holiday of 1933: suspension, licenses, and returning cash
The bank holiday proclaimed by Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 6, 1933, suspended ordinary banking transactions nationwide. Proclamation 2039 prohibited paying out deposits, making loans or discounts, dealing in foreign exchange, and transferring credits abroad. Its scope included the territories and insular possessions, every branch of a covered institution, and a wide definition of banking. Reserve Banks, savings banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, and credit unions were expressly included. The original document set March 6 through March 9 as the suspension period and identified withdrawals, hoarding, and gold drains as reasons for emergency action.
The proclamation also created room for controlled exceptions during the bank holiday. With presidential approval, the Treasury secretary could permit usual banking functions and authorize clearinghouse certificates representing claims against bank assets. Newly received deposits could be held separately, available for unrestricted withdrawal, with their funds kept in cash, at Reserve Banks, or in federal obligations. These provisions appeared alongside the prohibition on ordinary business. The suspension was therefore accompanied from its first day by delegated powers to preserve particular functions and keep new funds apart from the banks' existing assets.
Congress supplied a statutory framework on March 9. The Emergency Banking Act declared that remedies needed uniform national application and approved presidential and Treasury actions taken since March 4 under the specified emergency authority. It broadened that authority to regulate foreign exchange, transfers of credit, bank payments, and movements of gold, silver, and currency during a declared national emergency. Section 4 made member banks' business subject to Treasury regulations and restrictions, with presidential approval, during the prescribed emergency period. The act placed both the previous bank holiday measures and the operation of the banking system within the new legislative framework.
Title II addressed institutions whose assets needed protection. The Comptroller of the Currency could appoint a conservator to take possession of a covered bank's books, records, and assets while its future was settled. Examinations and reports supplied information about its condition. Conservators could receive new deposits under specified safeguards: those funds remained separate and could not be used to discharge the bank's old indebtedness. The legislation thus provided for conservation, investigation, and possible resumption of business, alongside powers to suspend it.
Executive Order 6073, dated March 10, set out the permission system. Treasury could authorize member banks and other federally organized institutions to perform usual banking functions. Member banks submitted reopening applications through their Reserve Banks; Treasury approval preceded issuance of a license by the Reserve Bank acting as Treasury's agent. For institutions outside that federal group, the order empowered the appropriate supervising authority in each state or other jurisdiction to permit operations. Reopening involved a chain of approval and agency, with distinct roles for the secretary, Reserve Banks, and state supervisors.
Permission to operate did not remove the order's other restrictions. Banks remained barred from paying out gold coin, bullion, or gold certificates without Treasury authorization. Currency withdrawals for hoarding were prohibited. Foreign-exchange transactions were confined to the order's specified categories, including normal business, reasonable travel and personal needs, and fulfillment of contracts entered before March 6. Reserve Banks were instructed to monitor foreign-exchange transactions in their districts and report prohibited dealings. The bank holiday's lifting therefore left continuing controls over particular movements of money and gold.
Roosevelt's March 12 radio address explained the emergency in terms of banks' assets and available currency. He described deposits invested in bonds, commercial paper, mortgages, and other loans, with a comparatively small portion retained in cash. The rush to turn deposits into currency or gold had exceeded even sound banks' immediate cash supplies. Selling assets hurriedly meant accepting panic prices. His description connected the closure to the supply of usable cash and explained why additional currency and time for examination formed parts of the reopening program.
The address announced a staged return. Approved banks in the 12 Reserve Bank cities would open on March 13, followed the next day by approved banks in recognized clearinghouse cities. Smaller places would follow as examinations, borrowing arrangements, and currency distribution allowed. Roosevelt acknowledged that some banks needed reorganization and would not immediately reopen. He also described assistance for state banks outside the Reserve System through member banks and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The schedule combined a geographical sequence with judgments about individual institutions, rather than promising that every closed bank would resume simultaneously.
Stephen Greene's later Federal Reserve history distinguishes the program's outcome from the government's initial plans. Currency held by the public had increased by $1.78 billion in the four weeks ending March 8. By the end of March, about two-thirds of that cash had been redeposited. His history also records that Treasury staff had prepared the emergency legislation during Herbert Hoover's administration before its rapid passage on March 9.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation 2039, March 6, 1933, The American Presidency Project — www.presidency.ucsb.edu
- United States Congress, Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1–7, Titles I and II — www.govinfo.gov
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 6073, Regulations Concerning the Operation of Banks, March 10, 1933, The American Presidency Project — www.presidency.ucsb.edu
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 12, 1933: Fireside Chat 1, On the Banking Crisis, recording and transcript, Miller Center — millercenter.org
- Stephen Greene, Federal Reserve History, Emergency Banking Act of 1933, later institutional history — www.federalreservehistory.org